Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Publications

Faculty Scholarship

1994

When Is An Error Not An "Error"? Habeas Corpus
and Cumulative Error analysis
Rachel A. Van Cleave
Golden Gate University School of Law, rvancleave@ggu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/pubs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
46 Baylor L. Rev. 59 (1994)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Publications by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact jfischer@ggu.edu.

WHEN Is AN ERROR NOT AN "ERROR"? HABEAS 'CORPUS AND
CUMULATIVE ERROR ANALYSIS*
Rachel A. Van Cleave**
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUGrION...........................................
II. WHY CUMULATE? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Cumulative Error Considered on Direct Review. . . . . . . . . . . .
B. No Stone-Bar to Cumulate Errors on Habeas.............
C. The Unpersuasive Eighth Circuit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
III. CUMULATIVE ERROR AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS.........
A. The Fifth Circuit "Beauty Contest" ......................
1. The Panel Majority. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. The En Banc Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Two Standards for Fundamental Fairness? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
IV. WHEN IS AN ERROR NOT AN ERROR? ......................
A. ''Actual Error" or "Adverse Event"? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
B. Failure to Object. . . . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
C. State Law Errors ......................................
V. A PROPOSED ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE ERROR. . . . . . . . . . . . .
I.

59
63
64
65

7.0
72
72
75

79
80
85
85
86

88
89

INTRODUGrION

Federal courts entertain petitions by state prisoners for habeas
corpus relief "only on the ground that [the prisoner] is in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States."l
Federal courts substantively and procedurally liinit the types of complaints which they will entertain. 2 First, federal courts will not hear
claims that evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
was admitted at the petitioner's trial as long as the petitioner had a
*Copyright 1993, Rachel A. Van Cleave,
**Teaching Fellow, Stanford Law School; Adjunct Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. B.A. 1986, Stanford University; J.D. 1989, University of California, Has~ings College of the Law; J.S.M., Stanford Law School (expected 1994). The author would
like to thank the following people for their helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft: Barbara A. Babcock, David C. Faigman, and Robert Weisberg. Thank you also to
Leslie Joyner Bobo who provided useful materials from the Derden case and to Joseph
Schottland for editorial and other support.
'28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3) (1988). For an excellent discussion of the history of the writ of habeas corpus, see generally, William F. Duker, A Constitutional Histqry of Habeas Corpus (1980).
'The list of limitations in the text is not exhaustive. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989) (a "new rule" will not be applied to a habeas corpus petition); McCleskyv. Zant, 449
U.S. 467 (1991) (failure to raise a claim in first habeas corpus petition will bar subsequent
petition absent a showing of "cause and prejudice").
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"full and fair" opportunity to litigate the claim in state court.s Second,
federal courts will not grant habeas relief where the prisoner complains of a violation of state law unless the violation amounts to a constitutional deprivation. 4 Third, a constitutional violation may not
mandate issuance of the writ where a federal court determines that
the error was harmless. 5 Additionally, the petitioner must not have
defaulted her claims by, for example, failing to object to the alleged
error at trial, or otherwise failing to follow state procedural rules. 6 Finally, a petitioner must exhaust all of his claims in state court before
he may petition for federal habeas corpus relief. 7
Typically, courts grant habeas relief based on a single, non-harmless
constitutional violation. But what about the cumulative effect of several errors? Should not ~ court grant habeas relief where a petitioner
alleges several "constitutional errors" each' of which is "harmless" but
which, in the aggregate, denied the petitioner of a fair trial? Or may
the petitioner allege several errors of state law, none of which individually amounts to a constitutional violation, but again, had a cumulative effect on the fairness of the trial? What should federal courts do?
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the use of cumulative error analysis in habeas corpus petitions and recently denied
certiorari in a case which squarely presented these issues. s
The issue regarding the parameters of "cumulative error analysis"
raises several difficult questions. First is the situation where a habeas
corpus petitioner alleges several "constitutional errors," meaning specific errors which clearly violate specific constitutional standards. In
this situation, federal courts employ a type of cumulative error analysis
by evaluating the overall prejudice that the defendant suffered as a
result of these "constitutional errors." While a court might find that a
single constitutional error was harmless in a particular case, cumulative error analysis requires a court to determine whether several "constitutional errors," otherwise individually harmless, were collectively
harmful. This is a "cumulation of harmlessness," which entails more
of a quantitative analysis of the petitioner's trial.
'Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976).
"Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct. 475 (1991).
'Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
"Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
728 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (requiring federal
courts to dismiss habeas petitions presenting any un exhausted claims).
"Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), ccrt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928
(1993). For a discussion of cumulative error in civil cases, see Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Jr.,
Analysis of Cumulative Error in the Harmless Error Doctrine: A Case Study, 12 TEX. TECH. L. REv.
561 (1981).
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The next situation is where a habeas corpus petitioner argues errors
of state law. 9 As previously indicateq, claimed errors of state law are
not cognizable in federal habeas corpus review. However, at some
point, numerous errors of state law may operate together to deprive a
petitioner of a' fair trial under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such a qualitative analysis raises questions as to
the definition of a fair trial.
The final situation consists of a grey area between the situations described above. This scenario involves errors which are not state law
errors, but neither are they bad enough to amount to federal constitutional errors; for example, errors which fail to meet a specific standard like "cause and prejudice." Again, such errors individually are
not of constitutional dimension and thus are generally not cognizable
in habeas corpus review. However, as with state law errors, at some
point these types of "errors" might also aggregate to deprive one of a
fair trial. This article addresses the second and third of these situations, which otherwise might .fall through the cracks, precluding
habeas corpus review.
A majority of federal courts entertain habeas corpus petitions requesting relief based on the "cumulative effect" of several errors, each
of which, when considered alone, would not warrant habeas relief, but
when taken together indieate that the petitioner has suffered a due
process violation. Nonetheless, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
has determined that "each habeas claim must stand or fall on its
own"IO and therefore does not consider the cumulative effect of several errors on the trial. However, the Eighth Circuit does not offer a
persuasive reason for this conclusion. I I
While the vast majority of habeas petitions alleging cumulative error
fail, only a few cases analyze in any detail precisely what "cumulative
error analysis" entails, and even fewer define the types of "errors"
which courts should consider for purposes of cumulative error analysis. Generally, when evaluating cumulative error claims, courts determine that the petitioner has not alleged any "constitutional errors"
and deny relief. This approach often excludes or ignores alleged errors which individually do not reach constitutional dimensions. By
excluding non-constitutional errors from the cumulative error analysis, federal courts employ a different analysis for due process violations in habeas petitions than they use in direct appeals, or in federal
9 A very narrow definition of state law is intended here, limited to violations of state
constitutions and state statutes.
IOScott v.Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990).
11 See infra Section II, C.
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criminal cases. 12 In federal criminal cases, courts may reverse a conviction in one of three ways: based on a single constitutional error;!!1
based on the cumulative effect of more than one constitutional but
harmless error;14 and based on the aggregate effect of several nonconstitutional errors. I5 There is no persuasive reason for federal
courts to employ a different standard when reviewing the fundamental fairness of a trial in habeas corpus review.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed to consider cumulative error claims in habeas corpus petitions, but at the same time
severely limited the types of "errors" which federal courts could consider for purposes of cumulative error. I6 One such limitation is that
the Fifth Circuit will not consider a violation of state law, for purposes
of cumulative error analysis, unless that violation amounts to a constitutional deprivation of due process. Therefore,.before the court will
consider a violation of state law for purposes of cumulative error analysis, that violation must first pass the threshold of amounting to a due
process violation. However, this is the same standard which errors
considered individually must meet. This common standard is whether
the petitioner's trial was fundamentally unfair such that "there is a
reasonable probability that the verdict might have been different had
the trial been properly conducted."17 If such an error reaches this
threshold, cumulative error analysis would not be necessary since the
writ would be issued based on the single state law violation which deprived the petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial. This prong of the
lOIn this article the term "direct appeal" refers to appeals taken from a state's court of
last resort to the United States Supreme Court. The term "federal criminal cases" refers to
cases appealed from federal district courts to federal courts of appeal and/or, the United
States Supreme Court. "Habeas corpus" refers to the "federal remedy available to a state
prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of confinement and seeks as relief her immediate or speedier release." Project; Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
. States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1991-1992, 81GEO. LJ. 853,1562 (1993). "Collateral attack" is another way to refer to habeas corpus petitions challenging the constitutionality of the state conviction.
U See Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1991) (panel opinion) and cases
cited therein. See also, Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527 (3d Cir. 1991).
I'See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en banc) (allowing the
cumulation of constitutional and non-constitutional errors in review of federal criminal
cases).
I·Id.
16 Derden v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Arguably, the Fifth Circuit
recognized cumulative error analysis in habeas corpus review in Mullen v. Blackburn, 808
F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1987). However, in Mullen, the court did not devote much discussion
to cumulative error analysis, but it denied the petition on the grounds that the petitioner
had failed to allege any errors at all stating, " [t]wenty times zero equals zero." Id. at 1147.
17Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 279 (5th Cir. 1985), cen. denied, 476 U.S. 1178
(l986); Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1991), rerJ'd, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir.
1992)(en banc), cen. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928(1993).
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Fifth Circuit's analysis amounts to allowing courts to consider only the
cumulative effect of constitutional, but individually harmless errors,
and is different from the analysis used in the review of federal criminal cases. Rather than dismiss errors which individually are not "constitutional errors," federal courts should more closely examine what
constitutes an "error" and then proceed to evaluate the cumulative
effect of the errors.
This article first addresses the question of whether courts should
consider cumulative error analysis in habeas corpus cases, or whether
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals is correct that each error must
stand on its own. Mter concluding that cumulative error analysis
should be a cognizable issue in habeas corpus petitions, the question
of whether courts should employ a different standard for habeas petitions alleging cumulative error is addressed. Emphasis is placed on
the Fifth Circuit case, Derden v. McNee~18 and. that court's rationale for
imposing limitations on habeas corpus petitions alleging cumulative
error. The Fifth Circuit's four-prong test for evaluating petitions alleging a due process violation based on the cumulative effect of "errors" is critiqued. Finally, this article proposes a standard for
cumulative error analysis that more carefully defines "error" and suggests that habeas corpus counsel point to specific legal standards violated by the alleged error. This standard requires that federal courts
consider a broader range of "errors" as well as the relationship among
the errors, in order to evaluate whether a trial was fundamentally
unfair.

II. WHY

CUMULATE?

There are at least three reasons why an allegation that aggregated
errors deprived the petitioner of a 'fair trial is a cognizable claim in
habeas corpus petitions. First, federal courts already consider the cumulative effect of errors on direct review. Second, there is no reason
to exclude cumulative error analysis from the scope of habeas corpus
review since such a claim is premised upon the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and falls outside the scope of Stone v.
Powel~ which excluded Fourth Amendment claims from habeas
corpus review. Finally, the only circuit which refuses to cumulate errors alleged in habeas petitions has provided little analysis as to why
courts should not cumulate errors ..

18

978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993).
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In Taylorv. Kentucky,19 the Supreme Court accepted the notion that
several errors, none of which individually rise to constitutional dimensions, may have the cumulative effect of denying a defendant a fair
trial. Taylor involved a direct appeal from a state court conviction of
robbery which had been affirmed by the Kentucky Court of Appeals. 20 .
The Supreme Court reversed based on the following: 1) the trial
judge rejected the defendant's presumption of innocence instruction;
2) the prosecutor was allowed to read the indictment to the jury in the
absence of an instruction to the jury that the indictment did not constitute evidence; 3) the prosecutor improperly made comments linking the defendant to every defendant previously sentenced to
prison;21 and 4) the instructions which were given by the judge were
"skeletal, placing little emphasis on the [state's burden] to prove the
case beyond a reasonable doubt and none at all on the jury's duty to
judge [the defendant] only on the basis of the testimony heard at
trial."22
The Court acknowledged that the phrase "presumption of innocence ... may not be constitutionally mandated,"23 but in Taylor, such
an instruction was essential to a fair trial due to the other circumstances listed above. Significantly, the Court did not expressly find
that the failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence constituted reversible error. Rather, the Court examined the absence of
this instruction along with the effect of other alleged errors. As to the
prosecutor's comments, the Court stated that "standing alone, [such
comments] would [not] rise to the level of reversible error.... They
are relevant to the need for carefully framed instructions designed to
assure that the accused be judged only on the evidence."24 In fact, the
Court even hedged on concluding that some of the prosecutor's comments were improper, stating, "the combination of the skeletal instructions, the possible harmful inferences from the references to the
indictment, and the repeated suggestions that [defendant's] status as a
defendant tended to establish his guilt created a genuine danger that
19
436 U.S. 478 (1978) .
•oThe Supreme Court of Kentucky denied discretionary review. Id. at 483.
21 Specifically, the prosecutor stated that the defendant "like every other defendant who's
ever been tried who's in the penitentiary or in the reformatory today has the presumption
of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 486. The Court found
that this statement "could be viewed as an invitation to the jury to consider petitioner's
status as a defendant as evidence tending to prove his guilt." Id. at 487.
22Id. at 486.
"'Id. at 485.
24Id. at 487, n.14.
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the jury would convict ... [defendant] on the basis of those extraneous considerations. "25
The Court did not decide whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to instruct the jury that the indictment was not
evidence. Furthermore, the Court declined to hold that the judge's
instruction defining guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt" as "a substantial doubt, a real doubt," constituted reversible error. Instead, the
Court stated that "the cumulative effect of the potentially damaging circumstances of this case violated the due process guarantee offundamental
fairness in the absence of an instruction as to the presumption of
innocence. "26
Taylor demonstrates that in the absence of any individually reversible errors, the Supreme Court has considered the cumulative effect
of several errors with respect to a claim alleging that the defendant
was denied a fair trial. In Taylor, the Court did not assess each error to
determine whether it was individually harmless. As to at least one error, the Court did not expressly find that an alleged error actually
constituted "error." Nor did the Court concern itself only with errors
which individually were of constitutional dimension. Rather, the
Court evaluated the circumstances surrounding the defendant's trial
to determine that the state had denied the defendant fundamental
fairness as guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Again, this is a claim that the petitioner was denied a
fair trial by a state court, and except for the procedural posture of the
case, is no different from a federal habeas corpus petition challenging
the fairness of the trial. Certainly, if federal courts will hear direct
appeals alleging a denial of fundamental fairness based on a cumulation of several errors, they must also entertain such claims asserted in
habeas corpus petitions.

B.

No Stone-Bar to Cumulate Errors on Habeas
As discussed above, federal courts have applied cumulative error

analysis in federal criminal cases to determine whether the aggregate
effect of errors at trial was so prejudicial as to require a reversa1. 27
Under cumulative error, a petitioner essentially alleges that she was
deprived of fundamental fairness due to accumulated errors at trial
.. Id. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
2·Id. n.l5 (emphasis added).
"United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane) (denied reversal of
conviction based on the cumulative effect of otherwise harmless errors); United States v.
Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Birdsell, 775 F.2d 645, 654 (5th
Cir. 1985), eert. denied, 476 U.S. 1119 (1986).
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which individually are not constitutional violations. In effect, the petitioner claims a Fourteenth Amendment due process deprivation.
While the Supreme Court has eliminated habeas corpus review of
Fourth Amendment violations in Stone v. Powel~28 a due process claim
based on the cumulative effect of errors falls outside the parameters
of Stone, which the Court has subsequently limited to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule violations.
The petitioners in Stone sought habeas corpus relief on the basis
that illegally obtained evidence had been introduced at their state trials. The Supreme Court addressed:
whether a federal court should consider, in ruling on a petition for habeas corpus relief filed by a state prisoner, a claim
that evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search or
seizure was introduced at his trial, when he has previously
been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation of
his claim in the state courts. 29
The Court balanced the justifications for enforcing the Fourth
Amendment via the exclusionary rule on collateral attack against intrusion on the values of finality and federalism when federal courts
grant habeas relief to state prisoners. For several reasons, the Court
concluded that federal courts were not to entertain claims of exclusionary rule violations on collateral attack. 30
First, the Court stated that the exclusionary rule, applied to the
states in Mapp v. Ohio,3l is not "a personal constitutional right,"32 but
rather serves to deter future Fourth Amendment violations and thus
should only be applied where "'its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served.' "33 The Court found that collateral considerations of Fourth Amendment violations would only "add marginally
to an awareness of the values protected by the Fourth Amendment,"34
given the likelihood that a habeas claim could occur years after the
alleged violation.
Second, the Court emphasized that allegations that illegally obtained evidence was admitted at trial rarely involved questions that the
conviction was unreliable. In fact, the Court stated that "the physical
evidence sought to be excluded is typically reliable and often the most
428 u.s. 465 (1976).
[d. at 469.
"'For a discussion of this balancing, see Peter McConnack, Comment, Habeas Corpus and
Due Process: Stone v. Powell Restricted, 17 Hous. L. REv. 923, 928-30 (1980).
"367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"Stone, 428 U.S. at 486.
"[d. at 486-87 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974».
··[d. at 493.
28
29
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probative information bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. "35
The Court further stated that habeas corpus petitions "for purposes
other than to assure that no innocent person suffers an unconstitutional loss of liberty results in serious intrusions on values important
to our system of government."36 This suggests that the Court's reasoning could apply to exclude from habeas review other claims that are
not relevant to a petitioner's guilt or innocence. 37 The broadjustifications which the Court relied qn to limit habeas corpus review disturbed several commentators who feared that the court was preparing
to exclude other claims from habeas review, especially if the claims
did not bear directly on the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. 38
The Court has been restrained in extending the application of
Stone. For example, in Kimmelman v. Morrison,39 the Court refused to
extend Stone to preclude habeas corpus review of a Sixth Amendment
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the trial attorney's
failure to seek exclusion of allegedly illegally obtained evidence. Over
defense counsel's objection, the trial court permitted the prosecutor
to introduce the evidence ruling that defense counsel should have
made a pre-trial suppression motion. Upon the Supreme Court's consideration of the habeas petition, the state argued that the Court
should not allow the petitioner to circumvent the Stone-bar by stating
his claim as one of ineffective assistance of counsel, rather than the
admission of illegally obtained evidence. However, the Court reasoned that the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is a "fundamental right ... [and] assures the fairness, and thus the legitimacy, of
our adversary process. "40 In contrast, the exclusionary rule is simply a
judicially created remedy to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights.
Thus, when an asserted right goes to the fairness and reliability of a
conviction, Stone will not apply to bar federal habeas corpus review.
"[d. at 490.
"'[d. at 491 (emphasis added). For a discussion of the "costs" of federal habeas corpus
review, see Sandra Day O'Connor, Habeas cqrpus and Judicial Federalism: Some Thoughts on
Finality, Comity and Error Correction, PUB. INTEREST L. REv. ANN. 3 (1992).
S7 See Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While it Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9, 13
n.28 (1990).
"Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander A1einikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and
the Court, 86 YALE LJ. 1035, 1086-95 (1977); Neil McFeeley, Habeas Corpus and Due Process:
From Warren to Burger, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 533, 553 (1976). See also, Erwin Chemerinsky,
Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 74~, 786 (1987). But see, Henry J.
Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant' Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REv.
142 (1970).
59
477 u.S. 365 (1986).
40 Id. at 375.
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Kimmelman substantially limited Stone by emphasizing the importance of the right to effective assistance of counsel. However, this result, along with other cases considering a Stone-bar, implies a hierarchy
of constitutional rights based upon the relationship of a particular
right to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner. 41 Nonetheless, while
Stone seemed to hint at requiring the petitioner to make a colorable
claim of innocence, in Kimmelman, the court relied more generally on
the significance of effective counsel to the fairness, and thus reliability
of a criminal trial.
In Jackson v. Virginia,42 the Court refused to apply Stone to habeas
petitions alleging that the conviction had been obtained on insuffident evidence. In Jackson, the petitioner, while admitting that he
committed homicide, claimed that the evidence regarding premeditation was insufficient to support a first degree murder conviction. The
state argued that Stone bars federal habeas corpus review once a defendant has received a full and fair hearing in the state courts regarding a sufficiency of the evidence claim. The Court rejected this
argument, reasoning that pursuant to In re Winship,43 due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that state prosecutions be
supported upon proof of each element beyond a reasonable doubt,
and that this issue is "central to the basic question of guilt or innocence."44 As in Kimmelman, the Court appeared to rely, not on
whether the petitioner can claim actual innocence, but rather
whether the right she asserts is one which bears directly on the reliability of the conviction, and thus on the issue of her guilt or
innocence.
As to an issue not relating to guilt or innocence, the Supreme Court
refused to extend the Stone-bar to habeas petitions alleging constitutional violations implicating the integrity of the judiciary in Rose v.
Mitchell 45 In Rose, the petitioner alleged that the grandjury foreman
had been selected in a discriminatory manner, violating the· Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court distinguished the Stone justification that state courts are equally capable of
adjudicating Fourth Amendment claims. In Rose, the Court stated
that where a petitioner alleges that the "state judiciary itself engages in
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, there is a
41 See, Kevin J. O'Brien, Comment, Federal Habeas Review of Ineffective Assistance Claims: A
Conflict Between Strickland and Stone?, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 183 (1986).
42
443 U.S. 307 (1979).
"397 U.S. 358 (1970).
"Jackson, 443 U.S. at 323.
"443 U.S. 545 (1979). See also, William F. Duker, Rose v. Mitchell and Justice Lewis Powell:
The Role of Federal Courts and Federal Habeas, 23 How. LJ. 279 (1980).
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need to preserve independent federal habeas review . . . . "46 The
Court also stressed the integrity of the judicial system as a concern
substantially greater in the context of grand jury discrimination cases
than in the context of violations of the exclusionary rule. "The claim
that the court has discriminated on the basis of race . . . brings the
integrity of the judicial system into direct question."47 Thus, even
where a particular right has little, if any, relevance to the guilt or innocence of the habeas petitioner, federal courts will entertain such allegations on habeas corpus review if the right bears on the integrity of
the judicial system.
Most recently, in Withrow v. Williams,48 the Court refused to extend
Stone to claims that a statement obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona49 was introduced at trial. The Court reasoned that, unlike the
exclusion of illegally obtained physical evidence mandated by Mapp,
Miranda "safeguards a 'fundamental trial right."'50 Furthermore, in
Stone, the Court relied in part on the inherent relia~ility of the illegally seized evidence as a reason for foreclosing habeas review if the
petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the Fourth
Amendment claim in state court. In contrast, the Court in Withrow
stated that the right protected by Miranda did not "serve some value
necessarily divorced from the correct ascertainment of guilt,"51 but
rather many statements obtained in violation of Miranda may be unreliable. As in Kimmelman and Jackson, the Court emphasized the importance of the right asserted by the petitioner and how that right has the
potential to diminish the reliability of the conviction, thus necessitating independent federal habeas review. 52
Regardless of whether Stone was correctly decided, given subsequent
limitations on the application of Stone, it is not a bar to habeas corpus
relief based on the allegation that the petitioner was denied a fair trial
due to the aggregate effect of several errors, each of which is either
harmless, or individually fails to am~unt to a "constitutional error."
46 Id. at 563.
'7Id.
48
113 S. Ct. 1745 (1993).
<9384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'"Withrow, 113 S. Ct. at 1753 (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990) (emphasis added)}.
01 Id.
"'In another recent case, Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (1993), the Court
cited to Stone in applying a different standard for determining the harmlessness of constitutional errors in habeas corpus petitions than the standard used on direct review. However,
Stone is relevant to the question of whether federal courts may exclude certain types of
claims from habeas corpus review. The issue of whether federal courts should entertain a
particular claim in habeas petitions is different from the question of what standards federal
courts should apply when reviewing a habeas claim rather than a claim on direct review.
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Again, this type of allegation is premised on the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. It therefore involves the integrity of the
state judiciary, similar to the issues involved in Rose, especially where
the petitioner claims that the trial judge'S conduct contributed to the
unfairness of his trial. As in Rose, where the state judge is accused of
impairing the fairness of a defendant's trial, a defendant should have
a federal forum. Similar to the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
rights asserted in Kimmelman and Jackson, a Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process right to a fair trial is a fundamental, trial, and personal
right, since it alleges that the petitioner has been denied fundamental
fairness. 53 Furthermore, where alleged errors are relevant to the credibility of the witnesses,54 as in Derden v. McNee~55 such a claim can bear
directly on the reliability of the .verdict and, thus relate to the guilt or
innocence of the habeas petitioner. Thus, Stone does not exclude allegations of cumulative error resulting in a deprivation of due process
from habeas corpus review.
C.

The Unpersuasive Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit is the only federal jurisdiction which refuses to
cumulate Due Process errors alleged by a habeas petitioner. However,
this circuit has never provided detailed reasoning for refusing to consider the aggregate effect of alleged errors. Instead, the Eighth Circuit has used sweeping language in its first case considering the
question which subsequent opinions nave routinely quoted.
In Lee v. Lockhart,56 the petitioner argued that evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment had been admitted at his trial.
The court, citing Stone v. Powel~ held that such an error is not a cognizable issue since the petitioner received a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim. The petitioner attempted to
avoid the Stone-bar by arguing that this was not the only alleged error.
In this context, when the petitioner alleged an error which federal
courts are not to consider at all, the court stated that" [e] ach claim of a
constitutional deprivation asserted in a petition for federal habeas
"'In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 698 (1984), the Court describes an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim as an "attack on the fundamental fairness" of the trial. The
Court then states that "fundamental fairness is the central concern of the writ of habeas
corpus." [d.
"See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), affd, 902 F.2d 1578 (1990).
""978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), cm. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993).
"754 F.2d 277 (8th Cir. 1985).
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corpus must stand on its own, or, as here, fall on its own, and Lee's
Fourth Amendment claim must fall under Stone. "57
This was the extent of the court's analysis. In fairness to the court,
the petitioner in Lee did not allege that several errors cumulatively
deprived him of a fair trial; rather, he argued that the court should
consider the Fourth Amendment violation because this was not his
sole claim of error.
In subsequent Eighth Circuit cases, the court has routinely quoted
the above language from Lee and refused to consider the cumulative
effect of otherwise cognizable habeas corpus claims on the petitioner's trial. 58 Certainly, where federal courts will not hear particular
claims at all, the petitioner may not avoid such rules by arguing that
there are other errors. Similarly, where a petitioner has failed to exhaust all of his claims in the state courts; he may not avoid the exhaustion requirement by arguing that he has also alleged claims which he
has exhausted. This would defeat the purpose of the exhaustion requirement. 59 However, unlike Fourth Amendment claims and nonexhausted claims, federal courts will entertain petitions alleging errors
which deprived the petitioner of a fair trial. Such claims come under
a due process analysis and have yet to be excluded by the Supreme
Court from habeas corpus jurisdiction. Thus, the Eighth Circuit's refusal to consider the aggregate effect of alleged errors is unsupported
and unpersuasive.
Furthermore, while the Eighth Circuit will not consider errors
which individually are not of constitutional dimension in habeas
corpus claims, the court will consider the cumulative effect of counsel's errors for purposes of a Sixth Amendment violation alleged in a
habeas corpus petition. 60 In Harris v. Houseurright,61 the petitioner
sought habeas corpus relief, claiming that he did not receive effective
assistance of counsel at his state trial and pointed to several "errors"
made by his appointed counsel. The Eighth Circuit stated that "[n]o
single error made by the petitioner's appointed counsel is of constitutional dimension. Yet, when viewed cumulatively, the multiple errors
... demonstrate that counsel's total performance was below the level
Id. at 279.
"Scott v.Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir. 1990), em. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1626; Byrd v.
Armentrout, .880 F.2d 1, 11 (8th Cir. 1989), em. denied, 494 U.S. 1019 (1990); Cooley v.
Lockhart, 839 F.2d 431, 432 (8th Cir. 1988); Wedemann v. Solem, 826 F.2d 766, 767 (8th
Cir. 1987); Hobbs v. Lockhart, 791 F.2d 125, 127-28 (8th CiT. 1986).
'9Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
""Harris v. Housewright, 697 F.2d 202, 206 (8th Cir. 1982).
6'697 F.2d 202 (8th Cir. 1982).
>7
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of professional skill."62 The court expressly rejected the State's argument that the court should evaluate each mistake individually, stating,
"[w] e cannot ... view the individual mistakes committed by the petitioner's attorneys in isolation. The record, viewed as a whole, establishes that the defense counsel's [sic] overall performance and the
cumulative effect of their multiple errors denied Harris effective
assistance. "63
There is no reason to refuse to cumulate errors for purposes of a
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, but to permit the accumulation of errors for purposes of a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit does not
explain the reason for this inconsistency. If several errors by counsel,
each of which individually do not amount to a Sixth Amendment violation, but cumulatively may have deprived a person of effective assistance of counsel, then several trial errors cumulatively may have
deprived a person of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. There is
no reason to distinguish between these two fundamental trial rights.

III.

CUMULATIVE ERROR AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS

. As discussed earlier, most federal courts devote little analysis to the
appropriate parameters of a cumulative error claim. In federal criminal cases where a defendant has alleged cumulative error, federal
courts examine whether the errors rendered the trial fundamentally
unfair. A trial is fundamentally unfair if "there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict might have been different had the trial
been properly conducted."64 Except for the Eighth and Fifth Circuits,
no federal courts make an explicit distinction between cumulative error alleged in direct appeals and cumulative error in habeas corpus
petitions. While the Eighth Circuit's discussion of the distinction is
cursory, in Derden v. McNee~65 the Fifth Circuit recently provided explanations for analyzing cumulative error in haQeas petitions
differently.

A.

The Fifth Circuit "Beauty Contest '66

Mr. George Guy Derden was convicted of burglary in the Circuit
Court of Clay County, Mississippi and was sentenced to seven years in
6' [d. at 206 (emphasis added) .
.. [d. at 212 (emphasis added).
"Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th Cir. 1985), ecrt. denied, 476 U.S.
1178 (1986).
6'978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), ecrt. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993).
66 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1463 (Garza, j., dissenting).
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prison. 67 The burglary for which he was convicted occurred February .
10, 1983; however, Mr. Derden was not indicted until October, 1985,
and his trial began on April 14, 1986. At trial, the State presented the
testimony of three individuals who admitted involvement in the burglary: Willie Sherrod, Jay Posey, and Tommy Turner.68 They testified
that the burglary had been planned by Ricky Forrestor, who was not
charged and did not testify at tria1. 69 These three testified that they
accompanied Mr. Derden, and his girlfriend, Pam Smith, in his van
on the drive from West Point, Mississippi to Wade's Grocery in Pheba
and participated in the burglary which was interrupted by an approaching car. They estimated that the burglary had occurred between 12:00 a.m. and 1:00 a.m. The witnesses who had chaSed off the
burglars testified that they had called the deputy sheriff to report the
incident at 1:00 a.m.70 However, the police log which the state failed
to produce showed that the call had not been made until 2:05 a.m.71
The three burglars testified that upon being chased off, Turner,
Smith, and Derden drove away, leaving Sherrod and Posey stranded. 72
Sherrod and Posey then obtained a ride back to West Point from two
farmers who testified that they arrived in West Point by 2:00 a.m. and
returned to Pheba by 2:30 a.m. Turner testified that Mr. Derden
drove himself, Turner, and Smith to Houston, Mississippi, taking back
roads, stopping for gas and to fix a defective tail light, before returning to West Point. Sheriff McNeel had Turner duplicate the
route and estimated that it took Derden, Turner, and Smith three
hours and fourteen minutes to drive from the scene of the burglary to
Houston and back to West Point.7!! However, the testimony of the
state's witnesses established that the burglary had occurred at 12:30
a.m., and Sherrod and Posey testified that when they returned to West
Point at 2:00 a.m., Turner and Derden were already there. 74
Mr. Derden maintained that he did not participate in the burglary.
He testified that on the day of the burglary, Sherrod, an employee at
Derden's carpet store, asked to swap cars with Derden. 75 The two
later met at the Apollo Club and traded cars. Derden testified that he
·'Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1991) (panel opinion) (citing 522 So. 2d 752
(Miss. 1988» .
.. [d. at 607.
"[d. at 608.
,old.
" [d. at 617.
'12[d.

at 608.

Id.
"[d.
,. [d. at 608-09.
15
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. and Smith then drove to Houston to measure homes for carpet installation, asking a police officer in Houston for directions and stopping
for gas. While Derden produced the receipt for the gas, he could not
remember the location of the homes he had measured for carpet.
Smith testified that she had been present when Sherrod asked to borrow Derden's van and when the two swapped cars.76 She also stated
that she had gone with Derden to Houston to measure homes for carpet. Two other witnesses testified that they were also present and
heard Sherrod ask to borrow the van on the night of the burglary.77
The jury convicted Derden. of burglary and the judge sentenced
him to seven years in prison. Sherrod, Posey, and Forrestor were not
indicted for burglary, and Turner received a five-year suspended sentence with five-years probation. 78
Mr. Derden appealed his conviction to the Mississippi Supreme
Court which determined that Mr. Derden alleged only one error worthy of discussion, that the prosecutor improperly sought commitments
from the jurors during voir dire that they would view the testimony of
the co-conspirators as th~y would any other witness. 79 Mr. Derden's
counsel had objected to the prosecutor's repeated question, but the
judge overruled these objections. 8o The Mississippi Supreme Court
acknowledged that the prosecutor's questions violated state law. However, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined that the trial court
cured the error by instructing the jury at the end of the. trial that they
were to "regard this t~stimony [of the co-conspirators] with great suspicion and to consider it with caution."81 The court then summarily
dismissed Mr. Derden's other allegations of error, stating, "[t]he other
assignments of error have been studied and are without merit and
unworthy of discussion. "82
Mr. Derden then petitioned for habeas corpus relief in federal
court, alleging the same errors he had alleged in his direct appeal to
the state supreme court. The magistrate determined that no individual error alleged by Mr. Derden entitled him to habeas corpus relief,
but that "the trial judge'S demeanor coupled with the prosecutor's overzealous actions combined to produce a prejudicial atmosphere
76Id. at 609.
77Id.
7·Id.

79Derden v. State, 522 So. 2d 752, 753-54 (Miss. 1988).
""Id.
• , Id. at 754.
•• Id. at 755.
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throughout petitioner's trial,"8g t4us entitling ,Mr. Derden to habeas
corpus relief.
The district court determined that while the Fifth Circuit has "indicated a willingness to consider the cumulative prejudice resulting
from trial errors in direct appeals, ... it has also indicated that cumulative error is not a proper basis upon which to grant habeas corpus
relief. "84 Relying on Mullen v. Blackburn,85 the district court concluded that the Fifth Circuit did not recognize cumulative error analysis in habeas petitions.
1. The Panel Majority
The Fifth Circuit panel opinion accepted the doctrine of cumulative error as a basis for habeas corpus relief for the purpose of determining whether the petitioner was denied a fair trial. 86 The court
acknowledged that while the Fifth Circuit had not expressly recognized cumulative error in habeas petitions, the Fifth Circuit had considered cumulative error allegations in direct appeal cases, and the
majority of sister circuits permit such allegations in habeas petitions. 87
The court emphasized that cumulative error analysis involves a "Fourteenth Amendment Due Process inquiry," and the~efore they were not
creating new law, but merely "applying that which was secured to the
accused over two hundred years ago. "88 Explaining the application of
cumulative error analysis, the court stated that "[t]here is no set
formula and each case must be independently examined."89 The reviewing court must determine "whether the trial taken as a whole is
fundamentally unfair."90 While this does not mean that a petitioner is
entitled to a perfect trial,91 if ·"there is a reasonable probability that
"'Magistrate's Report and Recommendation, 31 (emphasis added).
"District Court Memorandum Opinion, 2-3 (citations omitted). Alternatively, the district court found that Mr. Derden's petition was not "one where the aggregate of the errors
produced a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that petitioner was denied due process of
law." Id. at 4.
8'808 F.2d 1143, 1147 (5th Cir. 1987) (the court found that the petitioner had failed to
allege any error at all, stating, "[t]wenty times zero equals zero.").
86Derden v. McNeel, 938 F.2d 605, 609-10 (panel opinion), (5th Cir. 1991), em. denied,
112 S. Ct. 3028 (1992).
.
87Id. at 610.
88 Id. at 610.
89 Id. at 609.
VOId.
9' See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.").
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the verdict might have been different had the trial been properly conducted," then the trial lacked fundamental fairness. 92
Applying this standard for fundamental fairness, the panel agreed
with the magistrate that due to the cumulative effect of the judge's
conduct during trial,93 the prosecutor's improper questions,94 and the
weakness of the evidence against Mr. Derden, he suffered a due process violation entitling him to habeas corpus relief. 95 Similar to the
Supreme Court's holding in Taylor,96 the panel majority found that
when considered individually, the above three "errors" did not require habeas corpus relief. However, their cumulative effect rendered
Mr. Derden's trial fundamentally unfair. 97
The panel found that the prosecutor's repeated attempts during
voir dire to secure the jury's agreement to view the testimony of the
co-conspirators as they would that of any other witness contributed to
a denial of due process. 98 The prosecutor was allowed to ask the jurors seven times whether they would believe the testimony of the admitted burglars. While each question was slightly different, the
following is representative:
. . . as I understand it, you are all telling me that you will
weigh [the co-conspirator's] testimony as you would anybody
else's. If anybody says that they cannot do that, that they
could not weigh their testimony as they would anybody else's
would you please indicate it now by raising your hand?99
The Mississippi Supreme Court found this questioning incorrectly
stated the law that jurors must view the uncorroborated testimony of
an accomplice "with great caution and suspicion."loo Despite the fact
that defense counsel objected four times to this questioning, the
judge did not sustain the objection, nor did he instruct .the jury as to
the correct state of the law when defense counsel objected. Instead,
the judge stated, "[a]ll right, the record will reflect your objection.
go Derden, 938 F.2d at 609-10 (quoting Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272, 278-79 (5th
Cir. 1985), ccrt. denied, 476 U.S. 1178 (1986» .
•• [d. at 611-15 .
•• [d. at 615-17 .
•• [d. at 618.
96 See supra, Section lIA.
• ? Derden, 938 F.2d at 618 .
.. [d. at 615-17.
.. [d. at 615-16. The prosecutor also asked the following questions: "would ... anybody
simply disregard the testimony of [the co-conspirator's] simply because of a plea bargain
arrangement with them?" "Do any of you feel that such testimony from such witnesses is
inherently untruthful?" [d.
100 [d. at 616 (panel opinion).
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You may proceed.... The Court will instruct them on that, Counselor, at the proper time."lOl At the end of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that they were "to regard this testimony [of the coconspirator] with great suspicion and caution."I02 While the Mississippi Supreme Court found that this cured the error, the Fifth Circuit
disagreed stating that "[t]his miniscule instruction at the end of the
trial could not possibly have overcome the damage that was done at
voir dire."!03
The prosecutor also improperly elicited evidence of other crimes
allegedly committed by Mr. Derden, from co-conspirator Sherrod. 104
Defense counsel cross-examined Sherrod on his motive for testifying
against Derden. Sherrod admitted that he faced charges for prior
criminal activity which the prosecutor had agreed to drop. On redirect, the prosecutor began to question Sherrod further on these other
. crimes. Defense counsel objected, stating that he believed the prosecutor was about to ask an improper question. 105 The judge overruled
the objection and the prosecutor asked Sherrod, "[i]n all of these robberies . . . who was involved with yoU?"I06 Sherrod responded,
"George Derden." Upon defense counsel's second objection the
judge stated, "[a]ll right the objection is now sustained, and the jury
will be admonished to disregard that remark." Although the judge
immediately instructed the jury to d!sregard the statement, the panel
found that the prosecutor "blatantly disregarded the law of Mississippi
and introduced evidence of another crime separate from that charged
in the indictment."!07 The panel stated that this conduct alone would
not require habeas corpus relief but it "contributed significantly to
[Mr. Derden's] deprivation of due process."I08
The panel also quoted several portions of the trial transcript which
demonstrated thafconduct by the judge "tended to lead the jury to
believe that Derden and his counsel were not to be believed."lo9 During defense counsel's opening statement, the judge sustained several
101Id. at 615-16.
l"'Id. at 616 n.3.
10'Id. at 616. As to the need for immediate curative instructions, see United States v.
Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 63 (3rd Cir. 1976), em. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
104 Derden, 938 F.2d at 616-17.
10'Specifically, defense counsel stated, "[ylour Honor ... I object to this and I'd like to
make a record on it probably outside the presence of the jury. It's improper [reldirect; it's
grossly improper as [the prosecutor1 knows and I'd like to make a record on this because I
think I know what he's fixing to try to do." Derden, 938 F.2d at 616.
I06Id.
107Id. at 617.
losId.
ICJ9Id. at 611.
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of the prosecutor's objections on' the basis that defense counsel was
arguing his case. IIO However, the record indicates that defense counsel was attempting to walk the jury through the complicated and contradictory state's evidence to show that Mr. Derden could not possibly
have been involved in the burglary. I I I The judge also chastised defense counsel in the absence of an objection. 1l2
The trial judge also reprimanded Mr. Derden on several occasions.
Mr. Derden testified that he had filled the van with gas the same day
Sherrod asked to borrow it. Turner had testified that upon returning
to West Point after the burglary, he and Mr. Derden had stopped for
gas. Defense counsel asked whether, assuming Turner was telling the
truth, the van would have needed gas. Mr. Derden responded, I'[t]hat
van could have gone to Memphis, Tennessee without needing any
gas."113 Defense counsel then attempted to introduce into evidence
Derden's receipt showing that Derden had filled the van with gas.
The judge interrupted with the following: "Let me caution the witness. Mr. Derden, I don't care if it [the van] had gone to Memphis or
Chicago and the jury don't [sic] care either; just answer his question,
do you understand?"1l4
The Fifth Circuit panel found that this testimony was crucial.
"Derden wanted to discredit Turner's testimony that the van used in
the burglary had gassed up in Houston," concluding that "[t]his is important because the trial judge's comment seemed to indicate he did
not care whether the van would have needed any gas in Houston."1l5
When defense counsel attempted to enter into evidence business
records showing where he had installed carpet the following day, the
prosecutor objected that they were not relevant. The judge stated,
"[c]ounsel, he's testified where he was. Now I don't know what you're
trying to do with the records .... I am not going to let these records
in. He can testify where he was and what he did."1l6
II°Id.
Id.

III

"'The following is one such occasion. When attempting to recross Sherrod on whether
he had an opportunity to talk to the other co-conspirators, the judge stated "[clounsel,
what difference does it make if he had an opportunity to talk every day if he didn't talk.
Cross examine him on the times he did talk to them." The judge also demonstrated that
he was not paying attention when during defense counsel's closing argument, the prosecutor made an objection to which the judge responded, "I just wasn't paying any attention; I
don't know what was said, Counsel, but you may proceed." Id. at 612.
mId.
114Id.
... Id. at 613.
116Id.
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On cross-examination of Mr. Derden, the prosecution indicated
that there was nothing on the gas receipt to indicate when it had been
made, and Mr. Derden responded, " [w]ell, I've been injail, ladies and
gentlemen, since January twenty, eighty-[sic]eighty-five .... "117 The
judge interrupted, "must a minute. Face the lawyer and answer the
lawyer's questions, and you do not address the jury, you understand?
I'm not going to caution you about this again."118 The panel stated
"[s]uch a remark was inexcusable and could leave no other impression
with thejury [than] that Derden was guilty."1l9
While the panel concluded that the judge's comments considered
individually did not deny Mr. Derden a fair trial, when considered
together, they "substantially contributed to [Mr. Derden's] deprivation
of due process."120
The final contributing factors were the prosecutor's suppression of
a police radio log, and the weak and contradictory evidence given by
the co-conspirators. 121 The radio log indicated that the witnesses who
chased off the burglars called the police at 2:05 a.m. This could have
been used to impeach these witnesses since they had testified that they
called at 1:00 a.m. It could have also impeached the testimony of the
three co-conspirators by discrediting their account of what occurred
and when on the night of the burglary. As to the contradictory testimony of the three admitted burglars, the panel found that while this
alone was not a due process violation, it "bolsters our conclusion that
a violation of the Due Process Clause occurred."122
As the Supreme Court determined in Taylor, the panel found that
none of the errors individually required relief. Nor did the panel assess whether each error was harmless .. Rather, the court examined the
circumstances of the trial and concluded that the errors added up to a
"glaring violation of due process."123
2.

The En Bane Court

The Fifth Circuit then considered the case en bane and reversed the
panel opinion. 124 Writing for the en bane court, Judge Edith Jones
Id. at 614.
118Id.
II°Id.
'20 Id. at 615.
'0' Id. at 617-18.
'ftld. at 617.
'0' Id. at 618.
117

'''Derden v. McNee~ 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), eert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928
(1993). It is interesting to note that the panel had denied the state's request for a rehearing and for a rehearing en bane. Fifth Circuit Local Rule 35 allows an aetive judge on the
court to request the Chief Judge to poll the court for an en bane hearing. Since Judge
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prefaced the opinion by noting that the idea that federal courts entertain a habeas corpus petition alleging "a series of events none of
which individually violated a defendant's constitutional rights seems a
difficult theoretical proposition .... "125 While the court joined the
m.yority of circuit courts in recognizing habeas corpus allegations that
the cumulative effect of trial errors may deprive one of a fair trial, the
court established a four-prong test limiting the types of errors which
the court will consider. First, a cumulative error allegation "must refer only to errors committed in the state trial court. . .. If an action of
the trial court cured a putative error, the petitioner is complaining
only of an adverse event rather than actual error."126 Second, alleged
errors must not be procedurally bC;lrred. 127 Third, the court will not
consider errors of state law unless the errors rise to "constitutional
dimension."128 Finally, federal courts "must review the record as a
whole to determine whether the errors more likely than not caused a
suspect verdict."129 This new test so limits ~he errors which the Fifth
Circuit will consider in the aggregate that it undermines the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process and the fundamental right to
a fair trial.

B.

Two Standards for Fundamental Fairness?

The Fifth Circuit's en bane opinion imposes three limitations that
are not part of cumulative error analysis in federal criminal cases or in
direct appeal cases. This raises the question of whether federal courts
should employ a different due process analysis for habeas corpus petitions than that used in cases on ~irect appeal. Previously, this comment examined whether cumulative error analysis is a cognizable
claim in habeas corpus petitions. Once federal courts recognize cumulative error analysis, the next question is whether courts should apply a different analysis depending upon whether the claim is raised in
a direct appeal or in a habeas corpus petition.
Jones wrote the dissent to the panel opinion and the opinion of the court en bane, it appears that she also requested that the entire court be polled on the issue of whether to
hear the case en bane. Furthermore, given Judge Reynaldo Garza's comment that "[t]his
case has turned into a beauty contest between me and Judge Jones," indicates that there
was probably a great deal of letter writing among the judges about this case. Id. at 1463
(Garza, J., dissenting).
'25 Id. at 1456.
"Old. at 1458.
'''ld.
'fsld.

'''ld.
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The Fifth Circuit justified the more limited standard for cumulative
error on habeas corpus review for several reasons. First, "[t]he standard for reversal on direct appeal of a criminal conviction, . . . ,
should logically be more flexible than that available on collateral review."I30 Judge Jones, however, failed to explain why this is "logically"
so. Rather, the court pointed to Supreme Court opinions stating that
the Due Process Clause has limited application, and that "the category
of infractions that violate 'fundamental fairness' [has been defined]
very narrowly."131 Therefore, courts must exercise caution in holding
that an error which does not amount to a constitutional error "by itself might suddenly, when aggregated with other non-constitutional
errors, become worthy of habeas relief. "132
The Supreme Court has stated that fundamental fairness is a very
narrow concept and has described denials of due process as "the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept
of justice. In order to declare a denial of it we must find that the
absence of that fairness fatally infected the trial; the acts complained
of must be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair trial. "133 However, the Court has not imposed a different standard for fundamental
fairness for habeas corpus cases. In fact, the Court has never developed different standards for other constitutional rights when a habeas
petitioner has alleged a violation. For example, whether alleged on
direct appeal, or on habeas corpus, the standard for a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim is the same. 1M Very few
cases, whether on direct appeal or habeas corpus review, demonstrate
a deprivation of fundamental fairness. This fact alone does not provide the logic for a narrower standard for such a claim alleged by a
habeas corpus petitioner.
The Fifth Circuit states that federal court consideration of a cumulation of non-constitutional errors as a basis for habeas corpus relief
"may too easily conflict with established limits on the scope of federal
habeas relief."135 The court cites three United States Supreme Court
..Old. at 1457.

Id. (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990».
mId.
15SLisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941).
"'One must first show that counsel's performance was deficient and second that this
deficient performance was so prejudicial that the result of the trial is unreliable. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Strickland is a habeas corpus case, however the
Court applied the same standard in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), which the
Court heard on direct appeal.
,.. Derden, 978 F.2d at 1458.
151
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decisions in order to justify its limitations on habeas corpus cumulative error analysis. 136 However, the three cases cited do not involve
the use of a different constitutional standard for habeas corpus petitions. Rather, these cases state various procedural limitations on habeas
corpus relief.
In Coleman v. Thompson,137 the Supreme Court held that federal
habeas review is presumptively barred if it "fairly appears" that the
state court's dismissal was based "primarily" on a state procedural
rule. 138 Certainly, Mr. Derden should not be able to circumvent the
Coleman limitation by arguing cumulative error if one or more of his
claims were procedurally barred by a state rule. However, this limitation is not relevant in Derden, where the Mississippi Supreme Court
summarily dismissed all but one of his allegations without providing
any statement that his other claims were barred by state law. Furthermore, the state did not argue that Mr. Derden's claims were procedurally barred. 139
The Derden court also cited McCleskey v. Zant,140 which applied a
broader definition of abuse of the writ of habeas corpus. Pursuant to
McClesky, when a petitioner has failed to raise a particular claim in her
first habeas corpus petition, she will be barred from raising the claim
in subsequent petitions, unless she is able to show cause for failing to
raisethe claim in the initial petition and actual prejudice to her case if
the court refuses to grant relief. 141 Since Mr. Derden has filed only
one habeas corpus petition, the court cannot accuse him of abusing
"the Great Writ."
Finally, the court cited Teague v. Lane,142 which set out the standard
for determining whether a "new rule" will be applied to cases on collateral review. Derden does not involve the issue of a "new rule." Furthermore, while Teague states a different standard for the application
of new rules on habeas corpus than cases on direct review, retroactivity, addressed in Teague, is not a constitutional doctrine, unless of
,.. [d.

"'111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991).
156 [d. at 2554. In Ylst v. Nunnemaker, III S.Ct. 2590 (1991), the Supreme Court further
loosened this standard by holding that if a lower state court based its dismissal on state
procedural grounds, federal courts could infer that appellate state courts relied on similar
grounds.
""The en banc opinion concedes that "[n]either the state courts nor Mississippi's brief
has relied on procedural bar." Derden, 978 F.2d at 1459 n.8.
140
111 S. Ct. 1454 (1991).
141 [d. at 1470.
142
489 U.S. 288 (1989). For a critique of Teague, see Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris,
45 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1992).
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course the issue is the application of an ex post facto law. 148 Due process and fundamental fairness are constitutional doctrines. Courts
should use the same standards whether the claim is a federal criminal
case, direct appeal, or a habeas corpus petition.'
These three cases relied upon by the Fifth Circuit do not directly
support the conclusion that a different standard of fundamental fairness applies when such an allegation is raised in a habeas corpus petition rather than on direct review. However, these cases do support
the Supreme Court's emphasis on the need for finality of state court
judgments. Certainly, the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of finality of state court judgments, as well as notions of federalism. Any habeas corpus petition will raise concerns of finality and
federalism. 144 While the Fifth Circuit is probably correct in stating
that federal courts must exercise caution when evaluating a claim that
a trial was fundamentally unfair, they must also exercise caution when
deferring to these practical concerns as a basis for altering a constitutional standard.
A recent example of these concerns "running amok"145 is Brecht v.
Abrahamson. 146 In Brecht, the petitioner claimed that the state had referred to Brecht's post-Miranda silence in violation of due process
under Dayle v. Ohio.147 The issue was whether the state had to meet
the standard of harmlessness set forth in Chapman' v. California148 for
constitutional errors, or whether the harmlessness standard for nonconstitutional errors in Kotteakos v. United States149 applied. The
Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Dayle rule, rooted in fundamental
fairness and due process concerns, is constitutionally based, and not
simply a "prophylactic rule. "150 Nonetheless, the Court held that
where a constitutional error is alleged by a habeas corpus petitioner, the
Chapman "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not apply.151 Instead federal courts are to apply the less stringent standard
of Kotteakos.1 52
10

u.s. Const. art. I, § 9, d. 3.

eeJackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 322 (1979).
I"Judge Jones speaks of the danger that cumulative error analysis may easily "run amok"
and "swallow the jurisprudence construing specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights."
Derden, 978 F.2d at 1457.
146
113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
147
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
148
386 U.S. 18,24 (1967) (reversal not required where constitutional error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
149
328 U.S. 750 (1946).
I!SO Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1717.
151Id. at 1721-22.
152Id. at 1722.
144S
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Under Kotteakos, a court may find a non-constitutional error harmless if it "did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect .... "153 Justice Stevens' concurrence maintains that the burden is
still on the prosecution to demonstrate harmlessness. 154 However,
Justice White reads the majority opinion as placing the burden on
habeas corpus petitioners to show that the error "resulted in 'actua,l
prejudice.' "ISS The Court justified this distinction based on precedent noting that "collateral review is different from direct review.... "156 The plurality opinion also emphasized frequently used
reasons for distinguishing between collateral review and direct review
- finality of convictions, comity and federalism. 157 Justice O'Connor,
in dissent stated that these concerns "are inevitable whenever[habeas]
relief is awarded,"158 and she cautioned that "decisions concerning
the Great Writ 'warrant restraint' ... for [the Court] ought not to take
lightly alteration of the 'fundamental safeguard against unlawful
custody.' "159
The dissenting opinions in Brecht seem to accord the Chapman
harmless error standard constitutional status and emphasize the need
for the more stringent standard to assure the protection of federal
constitutional rights. 160 In contrast, the majority fails to explain the
nature of the Chapman standard; whether it is simply a "prophylactic"
rule to protect constitutional rights, or whether it is constitutionally
based. Instead, the majority relies ,primarily on notions of comity, finality and federalism to conclude that "it scarcely seems logical to require federal courts to engage in the identical approach to' harmless
error review that Chapman requires state courts to engage in on direct
review. "161
Given the broad'language of Brecht and the majority'S exclusive reliance on "equitable principles," 'it would appear consistent for the
Court to apply a different standard for cumulative error allegations
when the claim is raised on direct appeal to a federal court than when
it is presented by a habeas corpus petitioner. However, cumulative
error is also distinguishable. While it may not be clear whether the
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764.
Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1723 (Stevens,j., concurring).
l"Id. at 1727 (emphasis added) (quoting the majority at 1722).
lSOId, at 1719.
107 Id. at 1720.
IMId. at 1732 (O'Connor, j., dissenting).
109Id. at 1728 (O'Connor, j., dissenting) (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 113 S. Ct. 1745,
1756-58 (1993) (O'Connor, j., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
IMId. at 1726 (White,]., dissenting). See also id. at 1729 (O'Connor,j., dissenting).
161Id. at 1721.
I ..
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Chapman harmless error standard is constitutionally mandated, certainly an allegation that one has been deprived of a fair trial is a constitutional claim. Cumulative error analysis usually centers on the
fairness of the trial, and thus constitutes a cl;iim that the petitioner
has been denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
While such claims are rarely successful, they are nonetheless constitutionally based. Certainly, federal courts should not undertake cumulative error analysis on habeas corpus in a manner which would enable a
petitioner to circumvent other limitations on habeas review. 162 However, the Fifth Circuit's four-prong test is too restrictive because it
eliminates errors which, although individually are "non-constitutional," may nonetheless have contributed to a fundamentally unfair
trial.
IV.

WHEN

Is

AN ERROR NOT AN ERROR?

The Derden mcyority correctly notes that federal court review of
whether a petitioner has been denied a fair trial can become an "infinitely expandable concept,"163 requiring courts to carefully define cumulative error; however, the Fifth Circuit unduly restricts the "errors"
a court may accumulate.
A.

"Actual Error" or "Adverse Event'?

The court found that any claim of cumulative error must allege actual errors and not merely unfavorable or adverse events which are
not erroneous. 164 However, the Fifth Circuit's statement that conduct
by the trial court which has cured the error exempts the error from
the cumulative error analysis is unsupportable. First, a "curative" instruction by the court does not automatically cure an error. Instead, a
court examines the instruction to determine whether the error is
harmless. An error has still occurred; a curative instruction may simply make the error harmless. In review of federal criminal cases, most
federal courts consider all harmless errors cumulatively whether constitutional or non-constitutional.l 65 Yet under Derden, in habeas
corpus petitions, a curative instruction will downgrade the error to an
adverse event and the court will exclude it from cumulative error
analysis .
••• See supra Section II. C. (The Unpersuasive E,ighth Circuit).
'63 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1457.

See supra, Section III. A. 2 (The En Bane Court).
'''''See United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990) (en bane).
'64
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The Tenth Circuit in United States v. Rivera,166 emphasized that "cumulative-error analysis aggregates only actual errors."167 The court
stated that "[i]ndividual rulings frequently will have an adverse effect
on a party, but unless that party can demonstrate that the ruling was
an error, reversal would not be warranted."I68 The court defined error "generically to refer to any violation of an objective legal rule, ...
[and] there must be violation of a constitutional, statutory, or common
law, or a violation of an administrative regulation or an established
rule of court."169 While not addressing the issue presented in Derden
regarding the effect of a curative instruction, the Rivera court would
appear to allow consideration of such an error for purposes of cumulative error, and also consider the curative instruction in determining
whether a defendant has been deprived of a fair trial. While Rivera
was a federal criminal case, there is no reason to define error differently based on the procedural posture of a case.
Under this prong, the en banc court in Derden eliminated the two
instances of prosecutorial misconduct from cumulative error analysis.
The court appeared to acknowledge that "the prosecutor admittedly
overstepped his bounds under Mississippi law when in voir dire he
tried to commit the jury to evaluate the co-conspirators' testimony like
any other."170 However, based on the instruction given at the end of
the trial, as well as the Mississippi Supreme Court's conclusion that
the instruction removed the need to reverse Mr. Derden's conviction,
the Fifth Circuit excluded this error from its cumulative error analySiSPl Also excluded was the prosecutor's elicitation of testimony
from co-conspirator Sherrod that Derden had been an accomplice in
other robberies. Again, the court agreed that this constituted error,
but due to the prompt instruction by the trial judge, excluded this
error from its analysis of an aggregation of errors. 172

B. Failure to Object
When a defendant on direct review alleges an error to which she
did not object at trial, federal courts require her to show "plain error,"
IMId.

I.' Id. at 1470 (emphasis added).
169

Id. at 1470-71.
Id. at 1470 n.7 (emphasis added).

170

Derden, 978 F.2d at 1460.

17l

Id.

168

I72This conclusion was bolstered by the court's third prong, regarding errors of state law.
The court concluded that neither error reached constitutional dimensions, thus could not
be considered for purposes of cumulative error for this reason as well.
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as defined by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 173 However,
in habeas corpus petitions, where the petitioner has failed to object to
an error at trial, the petitioner must show cause for failing to preserve
the error and prejudice resulting from the alleged error. 174 When the
habeas petitioner alleges cumulative error, the Fifth Circuit imposes
the requirement that "a defendant [have] objected to errors to demonstrate that they were believed at the time of trial to have had an adverse effect on the defense, "175 before the court will consider the
error in its cumulative error analysis. In federal cases on direct review,
when an individual alleges cumulative error but has failed to preserve
a claim by objecting at trial, courts apply the "plain error" rule. 176 A
different standard is not used simply because the appellant argues cumulative error. Likewise, where a habeas petitioner alleges cumulative error but has failed to preserve trial errors, courts should only
exclude such errors from cumulative error review if the petitioner fails
to meet the cause and prejudice standard. While this limited standard
is difficult to meet, it at least provides a habeas corpus petitioner with
an opportunity to have the error reviewed by a federal court. Instead,
under Derden, failure to object to an error at trial will result in exclusion of the error for purposes of cumulative error review apparently
even if the petitioner is able to show cause and prejudice.
This prong eliminated Mr. Derden's allegations that comments by
the trial judge contributed to his deprivation of due process. While
the en banc court characterized some of the trial judge'S comments as
"ambiguous or imprudent,"177 "understandable,"178 and "regrettable,"179 the court did not confront the question of whether either individually, or together they constituted "error" - the violation of an
objective legal nile. Furthermore; 'without ever stating whether the
judge'S comments amounted to error, the court concluded that "[o]n
balance, the court ruled evenhandedly on both sides' objections."18o
This really is not the point. The issue is whether the judge acted improperly. Examining the record as a whole before considering
whether the comments were improper puts the cart before the horse.
mUnited States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1984); FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b) ("Plain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not
brought to the attention of the court.").
174Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,88 (1977). See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S.
536 (1976); Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973).
t75 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1458.
176United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
t'T7 Derden, 978 F.2d at 1459.
17·Id.
Id.
I"" Id. at 1460.
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As discussed in the next section, federal courts should first determine
whether the alleged errors violated an objective legal rule. Upon determining which allegations constitute errors, courts must then evaluate the trial as a whole. The court in Derden appears to justify its
conclusion that the judge's comments were not error based on its own
evaluation of the entire record. The other flaw in the Derden court's
analysis is that the court considered whether the trial judge'S conduct
alone violated due process. This is similar to the court's treatment of
errors of state law.
C.

State Law Errors

As to the third limitation on cumulative error analysis the Fifth Circuit will not consider an alleged error of state law unless it rises to
"constitutional dimension."181 Generally, errors of state law are not
cognizable in habeas corpus unless they "so infused the trial with unfairness as to deny due process oflaw."182 This is the same Fourteenth
Amendment due process analysis used for evaluating the cumulative
effect of trial errors. This restricts cumulative error analysis to errors
which are individually of constitutional dimensions. However, an error of state law is '~constitutional" only if it amounts to a due process
violation. When a habeas corpus petitioner claims that the cumulative
effect of errors denied her fundamental fairness, she alleges a due
process violation. Again, while no single error of state law may entitle
her to relief, several errors may have denied her a fair trial, and courts
should consider this possibility.
In Derden, this prong eliminated the prosecutorial errors of state law
described earlier, concluding that "these violations of state law were
not of a constitutional dimension."183 Instead, the court should have
considered whether the cumulative effect of the errors of state law
amounted to a due process violation.
Regardless of the merits of Mr. Derden's habeas corpus petition,
the Fifth Circuit has needlessly restricted the scope of cumulative error analysis. This type of allegation is rarely successful, and as Judge

'8'Id. at 1458.
'82 Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228 (1941). See also Estelle v. McGuire, 112 S. Ct.
475 (1991); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983).
'8' Derden, 978 F.2d at 1460. As to the police log discussed earlier, the en banc court
simply disagreed with the panel that the evidence was either material or exculpatory, stating that "[t]he police might have acted on their report slowly." Id.
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Higginbotham commented, the en banc majority took "a club to a
pup and by doing so [told] the world that it is a wolf."184

V.

A PROPOSED

ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE ERROR

The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "formulating a complete definition of unconstitutional cumulative error is not feasible .... "185 In
Derden, rather than establishing an approach explaining the types of
errors to evaluate in a cumulative error allegation, the court elected to
"eliminate certain types of complaints that should generally not be considered in cumulative error review."186 As discussed earlier, the Fifth
Circuit's limitations on cumulative error analysis unnecessarily exclude the possibility that several individually non-constitutional errors
might operate in the aggregate to deprive a defendant of a fa,ir trial.
In Taylor v. Kentucky,187 the Supreme Court did not find that the defendant suffered one constitutional error. Rather, the Court held that
several non-constitutional errors cumulatively deprived the defendant
of a fair trial. 188 Courts should afford a similar review to habeas
corpus petitioners. The approach proposed within attempts to
achieve a balance between the due process rights of habeas corpus
petitioners and the Supreme Court's concerns for finality, comity, and
federalism. It would eliminate only two types of claimed errors from
cumulative error analysis. First, courts should not consider non-exhausted claims. For example, if a petitioner alleges that the state
court violated her right to confront the witnesses against her, but she
failed to exhaust this claim in state court, she may not, in a federal
habeas petition allege such a claim as part of a cumulative error allegation. Second, federal courts should not consider Fourth Amendment claims for purposes of cumulative error when the petitioner had
a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim in state court. Cumulative error analysis should not include these claims because they are
both barred from habeas corpus review. If a petitioner presents exhausted and non-exhausted claims, a federal court must dismiss the
petition and require the petitioner to present all non-exhausted
claims to the state courts. Of course, the petitioner may decide to
proceed with the habeas corpus petition as to the exhausted claims. If
184 Id. at 1462 (Higginbotham, j., concurring) (cumulative error analysis is "quite narrow-as evidenced by the majority's inability to locate more than two instances from our
thousands of habeas cases in which a state petitioner has succeeded with the argument.").
'" Id. at 1458.
186 Id. (emphasis added).
18'436 U.S. 478 (1978).
188 Id. at 487-88.
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the petitioner makes this choice, he may not avoid the total exhaustion rule by attempting to raise the non-exhausted claims in the form
of a cumulative error allegation.
There is an exception to the Stone-bar. Unlike exceptions to other
limitations on habeas corpus review, the exception to Stone does not
permit an examination of the Fourth Amendment claim per se.
Rather, it allows a federal court to examine the adequacy of the state
procedure for evaluating such a claim. Where a petitioner is unable
to show that she was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate her
Fourth Amendment claim in ~tate court, courts should not allow her
to present the merits of the claim as part of a cumulative error allegation. Aside from these two limitations, federal courts should consider
any alleged error as part of cumulative error review. The following
discussion describes the analytical steps which courts could employ in
order to produce opinions which evaluate cumulative error claims in a
more principled manner.
A federal court should examine each alleged error and determine
whether it in fact constitutes an error, under either constitutional or
non-constitutional standards. In determining whether an error has
occurred, courts should employ a broad definition of error to include
"any violation of an objective legal rule. "189 At this point in the analysis, courts should not simply conclude that an error, if error at all, was
not of constitutional magnitude. The premise of cumulative error
analysis is that several errors can operate in the aggregate to deny the
petitioner a fair trial. Without confronting the question of whether
the alleged error is actually an error, courts cannot evaluate a cumulative error allegation.
If an alleged error was an error, courts should then evaluate
whether the individual error amounts to a constitutional error. Of
course, if only one particular error amounted to a constitutional error, federal courts already evaluate the error to determine whether it
was harmless. In evaluating the error for harmlessness, federal courts .
examine the entire record and even consider "prejudicial circumstances" to determine whether the error was harmless. This step
merely restates established law.
If there are several constitutional errors, each of which individually
was harmless, courts should then consider the cumulative effect of
such errors. In United States v. Rivera,190 the Tenth Circuit described
cumulative error as "an extension of the harmless-error rule, which is
I ••

190

United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1470 n.7 (lOth Cir. 1990) (en bane).
900 F.2d 1462 (10th Cir. 1990).
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used to determine whether an individual error requires reversal."191
The court stated that "[a] cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates
all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, . . .
and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of the
trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be
harmless. "192 As with the evaluation of a single error's harmlessness,
when judging the cumulative effect of several constitutional, but individually harmless errors, courts should examine the entire record as a
whole.
Courts must then evaluate the relevance of individually non-constitutional errors. Of course, the general rule is that habeas corpus review is available to remedy only cons*utional defects. However, as
discussed, a constitutional deprivation may result from several errors,
each of which individually did not impair the defendant's constitutional protections, but when considered in the aggregate denied the
defendant a fair trial. This step seeks to pay deference to the limitations on habeas corpus review, but allow for consideration of such a
situation. Most importantly, cumulative error analysis should include
errors of state law that individually are not of constitutional dimensions. In Dcrdtm, the Fifth Circuit discounted two clear violations of
state law by the prosecutor because individually, each error did not
amount to a constitutional deprivation. 193 My analysis would include
these errors in a cumulative error analysis.
I suggest that federal courts evaluate and characterize non-constitutional errors into two categories: "actual errors" and "prejudicial circumstances." By categorizing non-constitutional errors in this way,
courts will better understand the significance of these errors and be
better prepared to evaluate the petitioner's trial for fundamental
fairness.
Courts should separate non-constitutional errors into "actual errors" and "prejudicial circumstances." Actual errors would include
any "defect, irregularity and variance"194 to which the petitioner objected at trial, and did not otherwise default, even if the alleged errors
constitute violations of state law. Furthermore, when the petitioner
objected at trial, and the trial judge sustained the objection, or instructed the jury in an effort to "cure" the error, courts should still
consider this an "actual error" and consider the curative instruction in
,., Id. at 1469.
'92 Id. at 1470.
I •• See supra Section IV. c. (State lAw Errors) .
'''FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
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their evaluation of the entire trial. In United States v. Berry,195 the
Ninth Circuit determined that for purposes of cumulative error analysis, the court would consider "errors and instances of misconduct
which we earlier held were adequately cured by the court's instruction. We recognize that a trace of prejudice may remain even after a
proper instruction is given. If we find a residue of prejudice, we will
take it into account."196 Similarly, in Derden, the court should have
included the violations committed by the prosecutor despite the fact
that the judge properly instructed the jury. A curative instruction as
to Mr. Derden's alleged involvement in other robberies was given
promptly. However, this evidence was extremely prejudicial, especially in a case where Mr. Derden's credibility was crucial since the
only evidence tying him to the burglary was the testimony of the admitted burglars. While the trial judge eventually instructed the jury as
to the correct law regarding the testimony of co-conspirators, this instruction came at the end of the trial, while the error occurred at the
beginning. 197 Again, the court should have considered the facts sur. rounding the error" and the putative curative instruction, rather than
simply excluding the error from cumulative error analysis.
In addition, when the petitioner failed to object at trial or otherwise
defaulted, courts should still consider an allegation as "actual error,"
rather than a "prejudicial circumstance," if the petitioner is able to
show "cause and prejudice" pursuant to Wainwright v. Sykes. 198 Again,
when a claim of error is not part of a cumulative error argument, federal courts will consider non-preserved errors if the petitioner can
meet the "cause and prejudice" standard. 199 Courts should not abandon this standard simply because the petitioner seeks habeas corpus
relief based on the cumulative effect of errors. In Derden, the Fifth
Circuit stated that "none of the judge's comments is even an obvious
abuse of discretion."2oo It is not clear whether the court intended to
imply the "cause and prejudice" standard and simply concluded that
Mr. Derden failed to meet this with respect to the judge's remarks.
'"'627 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1980), em. denied, 449 U.S. 1113 (1981).
19·Id. at 201. The court ultimately held that there was no "cumulative prejudice" and
affirmed the conviction.
'97 See supra discussion in Section III. A. 1. (The Panel Majority).
98
'
433 U.S. 72 (1977). Certainly, where the allegation is procedurally barred, habeas
corpus petitioners should consider framing their complaint as one of ineffective assistance
of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 669 (1984). See Peter W. Tague, Federal Habeas Corpus and Ineffective Representation of Counsel: The Supreme Court Has Work to do,
31 STAN. L. REv. 1, 5 n.25 (1978).
'99 See supra Section IV. B. (Failure to Object).
2("'Derden v. McNee~ 978 F.2d 1453, 1460 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane), em. denied, 113 S. Ct.
2928 (1993).
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Nor is it clear that an abuse of discretion standard applies to statements by a judge which the defendant claims could have led the '~ury
to believe that Derden and his counsel were not to be believed. "201
The court should have more closely examined whether the judge's
comments either separately or together were improper, then analyzed
whether Mr. Derden was able to show "cause and prejudice," as to
those comments which were error, since he did not object to them at
trial.
"Prejudicial circumstances" consist of those events to which the petitioner failed to object, and cannot meet the "cause and prejudice"
standard, but otherwise constituted errors. Courts should consider
such circumstances not as part of the aggregation of error, but rather
as part of their evaluation of the overall fairness of the petitioner's
trial. Certainly, courts should not consider events which do not pass
the above threshold standard of constituting an error at all as either
an "actual error" or a "prejudicial circumstance." However, if Mr.
Derden demonstrated that some of the judge'S comments were error,
but he was unable to show "cause and prejudice," under my analysis,
the Fifth Circuit would have considered the comments "prejudicial
circumstances" and evaluated the "actual errors" in light of the "prejudicial circumstances" to determine whether Mr. Derden was denied a
fair trial.
Once a court has determined the nature of the alleged errors, the
final step is to examine the record as a whole to determine whether
the petitioner was deprived of a fair trial. In conducting such an evaluation, courts should devote particular attention to the relatedness of
the errors. The best way to explain this concept is to examine some
examples.
In Walker v. Engle,202the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals granted
habeas corpus relief on the basis that several errors operated cumulatively to deprive Walker of a fair trial. Walker had been charged with
felony murder. Two men who had been convicted of involvement in
the crime testified that Walker was the triggerman who killed a police
officer. Walker's alibi was that he was confined in the Cuyahoga
County Jail on the day of the robbery and killing. The state's response
was to introduce evidence showing that the officers who ran the jail
were "so corrupt and/ or ineffective that Walker could have gotten out
of jail before [the robbery] and then returned."203
Derdm, 938 F.2d at 611 (panel opinion).
202703 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.), em. dmied, 464 U.S. 951, 464 U.S. 962 (1983).
!o' [d. at 961-62.
201
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On habeas, the Sixth Circuit considered the cumulative effect of
primarily evidentiary errors on the fairness of the petitioner's trial.
Acknowledging that errors of state law regarding the admissibility of
evidence are generally not cognizable hi federal habeas corpus review,
the court determined that Walker's "trial was inflamed by marginally
relevant and irrelevant evidence that was highly prejudicial ... [which]
allow[ed] the trial to focus more on the claimed corruption of the
Sheriff's Department than on the issue of Walker's guilt or
innocence. "204
Specifically, witnesses were allowed to testify as to the Warden's
criminal convictions which occurred long after the robbery and murder for which Walker was charged. 205 An examiner for the State Auditor was allowed to testify as to inaccuracies and shortages in the jail's
commissary account funds. 206 Aggravating this error, the prosecutor
argued in closing that the records were introduced" [t] 0 show you that
all the thieves and the bad people weren't on the inside of the jail;
that if you lie and steal [sic] what says you won't let a prisoner out for a
weekend or a few days."207 The state was allowed to put a witness on
the stand who refused to swear in, and then through other witnesses
was permitted to "suggest to the jury that [the unsworn witness'] testimony would have been helpful to the prosecution had he testified. "208
All of these errors related to the issue of the corruption and ineffectiveness of the jail's personnel, an issue which had little to no relevance to Walker's guilt or innocence. In considering cumulative error
allegations, federal courts should be especially sensitive to situations
where several errors are related to a particular problem, such as distracting the jury from the issue of guilt or innocence.
Another example of the importance of examining the relationship
among several errors is Cooper v. SowderS. 209 As in Walker, the errors
alleged by Cooper were violations of state law, and the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged that federal courts are not to consider an error of state
law unless that error amounts to a denial of due process. Nonetheless,
the court examined the cumulative effect of such errors, even though
each error, individually, did not result in a deprivation of due process.
In Cooper, the petitioner sought habeas corpus relief from a state
conviction of murder. The first alleged error was that a police officer
was allowed to testify that during his investigation of the murder he
-Id. at 968.
•0. Id. at 963 .
• 06 Id. at 963-64.
'07Id. at 964 .
• 08 Id .
09
•
837 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1988).
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"found no evidence that would link any of those other suspects to this
crime. . .. The only evidence we found that would link anybody to
this crime would be Mr. Cooper. "210 The court found that this testimony constituted error because it "suggest[ed] to thejury the guilt of
the accused and the innocence of other suspects, "211 thus invading
the province of the jury. The court also found error with the trial
judge's comments that the police officer was an "expert."212 Firstly,
there was no proof as to the officer's qualifications as an expert,21S
and secondly, there was nothing specialized about the officer's opinion, to even require that he be an expert. 214 The third error found
was with the police informant's testimony who was permitted to testify
that he had provided information in the past, which had led to arrests
and convictions. 215 The court found that this testimony bolstering the
informant's credibility was not relevant and was prejudicia1. 216 Each
of these errors related to the credibility of the state's witnesses, which
in turn impinged on the credibility of the defendant. The issue of
credibility is especially relevant when the evidence against the defendant is not overwhelming and when, as in Cooper, the case against the
defendant is a "close" one. 217
United States v. Wallace,218 although a federal criminal case, is another example of how a court should consider the cumulative effect of
errors on the defendant's credibility. In Wallace, the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy and of possession with intent 'to distribute heroin. 219 The government witness who provided the crucial testimony
linking Wallace to the distribution of heroin was provided by an admitted co-conspirator, Sterling. 220 Wallace alleged that the government did not provide her with Sterling'S written notes which Sterling
testified that she had referred to while testifying before the grand
jury.221 The Ninth Circuit found that the government's failure to produce these notes was error, but remanded to the district court to determine whether the error was harmless. 222
.'OId. at 287.
211 Id.
(quoting Cooper v. Kentucky, No. 84-SC494-MR, slip op. at 2 (Liesbon,
dissenting» .
·'·Id. at 287-88 .
.,. Id. at 288 .
•,. Id.
•,. Id.
·'·Id.
• 17 Id.
,8
• 848 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1988), aJfd, 902 F.2d 1580 (1990).
·'·Id. at 1466.
220 Id. at 1467.
22IId. at 1470-72.
... Id. at 1471.
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The court also found that the district court improperly allowed the
government to impeach Wallace with a heroin conviction which was
over ten years old. 223 The court further found that the prosecutor
engaged in improper vouching during the direct examination of Sterling and during closing arguments. 224 The court noted that the defense did not object at trial, but concluded that the district court must
review the entire record to determine whether the improper vouching
amounted to "plain error."225 Finally, the court found that although
Wallace was given Miranda warnings upon her arrest, the district court
erred in holding that she had waived her rights, and that her subsequent statements should not have been admitted at trial. 226
The court remanded the case stating:
[a]lthough each of the above errors, looked at separately,
may not rise to the level of reversible error, their cumulative
effect may nevertheless be so prejudicial to [Wallace] that reversal is required.... Our court is particularly sensitive to
allegations of prejudice where, as here, the convictions are
based on the largely uncorroborated testimony of a single
accomplice or co-conspirator. 227
The court further emphasized that due to the "credibility contest
between the defendants and the co-conspirator witness, we are particularly troubled by the possible cumulative effect of those errors which
go to the credibility of the witnesses. "228
In a footnote, the court explained the relevance of the
prosecutorial vouching, to which the defendant failed to object, stating,"[a]lthough the [prosecutorial] vouching was unobjected to at trial
and may not alone amount to plain error, it is, in any event, relevant
to the central issue of Sterling's credibility. Considered with the conduct that was error, the vouching may have contributed to prejudice
to [Wallace] ."229 Thus the Ninth Circuit will consider errors which
otherwise are precluded from direct appeal review under a cumulative
error analysis. Under my proposed analysis for cases, if the improper
vouching did not meeting the "cause and prejudice" standard, a court
.25 Id. at 1472-73.

at 1473-74.
at 1474.
at 1475.
at 1475 (citations omitted) .
at 1476.
229 Id. n.21. See also United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 201 n.7 (9th Cir. 1980) ("We do
not decide whether several errors may constitute 'plain error' in the aggregate or whether,
once we decline to review an error, we may no longer consider it for any purpose.").
"4Id.
22. Id.
•2·Id.
• 27 Id.
..ald.
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would consider it a prejudicial circumstance in its evaluating the trial
as a whole.
In Derden, credibility was the crucial issue. The only evidence
presented by the state which linked Mr. Derden to the burglary was
the testimony of the three admitted burglars. Much of their testimony
was not only uncorroborated, but was often contradicted by the coconspirators and other state witnesses. Thus, the court should have
evaluated the errors in terms of their effect on the credibility of the
witnesses.
Nearly every error alleged by Mr. Derden concerned the credibility
of the state's witnesses, as well as the credibility of Mr. Derden himself.
The prosecutor's erroneous voir dire questioning improperly bolstered
the credibility of the admitted burglars who testified against Derden.
The erroneous admission at trial of Mr. Derden's alleged prior criminal conduct directly impinged upon Mr. Derden's credibility.· The
trial judge's hostile comments toward Mr. Derden and his counsel
could have led the jury to disbelieve Mr. Derden and his attorney.
Certainly, different judges will evaluate differently claims that one
has been deprived of a fair trial, and so it seems was the case for Mr.
Derden. The proposed analysis does not solve this "know it when I see
it problem." However, by forcing reviewing judges to more candidly
confront the question of what constitutes an "error," and to evaluate
the relationship among the errors, the proposal may result in opinions which move away from free-floating notions of fairness, without
unnecessarily restricting the due process clause for habeas corpus'
petitioners.

